The Collective Action Problem by Goodin, Robert
 
Published in Fair Priority Setting and Rationing at the Bedside, ed. Marion Danis, 
Samia Hurst, Anne Marie Slowther, Reidun Forde and Leonard M. Fleck (Oxford:  
Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 224-37. 
 
Chapter 13 
 
The Collective Action Problem* 
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A classic collective action problem has the following structure.  Each actor 
would be better off if everyone were to perform a certain action.  But each 
actor would be even better off than that if everyone except her were to perform 
that action.  Each one of them is thus tempted to let the others perform the 
action, while not doing so oneself.  Yet each of the others, being identically 
situated, does the same.  So no one ends up doing it at all.  
That is the "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin, 1968). The tragedy lies in 
the fact that an outcome that would have been better for all concerned, if only 
they could have organized to act collectively in pursuit of it; but that outcome 
is virtually impossible to obtain through uncoordinated private action (Olson 
1965; Hardin, 1982; Ostrom, 1990). 
 For a familiar example, consider the case of fisheries.  All fisherfolk 
would be better off if all of them restricted their catch to sustainable levels. 
Each of them, however, has a private motive to catch more than that.  Yet if 
* I am grateful to Marion Danis, Alan Wertheimer, and Dave Wendler for discussion of these 
issues and to Len Fleck and Annette Rid for comments on a previous draft of this 
chapter. 
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all of them do so, overfishing will lead to the exhaustion of the fishery.  None 
of them want that to happen:  quite the opposite.  But no one of them (and no 
small group of them) can, by desisting, prevent that from happening.  So each 
acts on his private motive, and overfishing ensues.      
Real world collective problems are vastly more complicated than those 
examples might imply.  Even as regards fisheries, restrictions might rightly 
concern not merely how many fish you can catch but what kinds, what sizes, 
and where.  Likewise, restrictions on the use of a common pasture might have 
to stipulate a trade-off schedule among various different animals that might 
be put out to graze there, or specify tradeoffs between grazing and cultivating 
the common lands.  In medical applications, the schedule for restricting 
allocation of resources according to conditions and prognoses will be even 
more complicated, by many orders of magnitude, than that.  Without 
meaning in the least to downplay the difficulty of coming up with a remotely 
defensible schedule, I merely observe that the structure of the problem is the 
same across all these cases. 
 In connection with bedside rationing, the common pool resource that 
is most commonly discussed is health care funding, be it in the form of a fixed 
national healthcare budget or some smaller pot of funds in the case of  more 
decentralized systems. (Asch and Ubel, 1997; Ubel and Goold, 1997).  As such 
the issue is labeled ‘cost containment.’ Of course, just how much importance 
should be assigned to containing costs of health care is contentious.  Some 
would insist that "economic... considerations are not germane to ethical 
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medical practice" at all (quoted in Aaron and Schwartz, 1984, p. 127).  Indeed, 
Wyller has argued this point in chapter 15. Even those not disposed toward 
that extreme view must nonetheless acknowledge that pressure on the health 
budget could be reduced in at least two ways:  one would be by reducing 
demand, through rationing; another would by increasing supply, through 
increased healthcare funding or making more effective use of available 
resources.   
 Cost containment looks like a classic common pool resource only if we 
regard the health budget as strictly fixed.  That, many would say, is not 
something we should easily concede.  Perhaps in the long term we should 
not.  Perhaps we should instead campaign for increased health care funding, 
or even an open-ended commitment to meeting health care needs regardless 
of cost.  Perhaps we should campaign for improved effectiveness of the 
medical use of resources.  Those are important long-term projects that may 
eventually bear fruit.1 
 In the short term, however, matters are typically otherwise.  The 
supply of health care resources available at any given time is ordinarily 
strictly fixed and limited.  Where that is so, the supply of those fixed 
resources would indeed be a common pool resource, and bedside rationing to 
maximize the health benefits derived from it would pose a collective action 
problem of the sort just described. 
1 So too is improving health worldwide.  But for purposes of this chapter I set aside issues of 
global justice and concentrate on issues of health care within one country. 
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The bulk of this chapter will indeed discuss bedside rationing primarily 
in terms of cost containment.  But it bears emphasizing that it is not purely a 
matter of cost containment alone.  Collective action problems of a strictly 
analogous sort arise in other respects as well.  Let me offer just two other 
health-related examples, to suggest the generality of the issues involved. 
Consider, for one other example, the role of overprescribing in leading 
to the emergence of antibiotic resistant bacteria.  All patients have a common 
interest in that not happening.  Assuming there is any chance at all that the 
drug might be even minimally efficacious, each patient has an interest in 
being prescribed the drug by his own physician.  Each patient hopes that all 
other physicians exercise restraint, while his own does not.  Yet if each gets 
what he wishes for in his own case, no restraint will be exercised by any, and 
the efficacy of the antibiotics will be eroded for all.   
For another example, consider a vaccination that carries some slight risk 
of adverse consequences.  Any given patient might prefer to avoid that risk 
by not receiving the vaccination, trusting that enough of the others around 
him will have been vaccinated to provide "herd immunity" (Anderson and 
May, 1985).  But of course if everyone does that then there will be no herd 
immunity.  If each physician respects the wishes of her own patient in this 
regard, then the common pool resource is extinguished. 
Supposing the health budget to be strictly fixed, the same is true of 
bedside practices of prescribing treatments that are somewhat less efficacious 
but substantially less expensive, or refraining from the use of marginally 
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effective treatments altogether.  Each patient hopes his physician will provide 
him with the very best treatment available, whatever the cost, while hoping 
that physicians prescribe lower-cost treatments (or no treatments) to others to 
protect the health budget that is paying for his treatment.  But again, if each 
gets what he wants in his own case, then the overall health budget is 
seriously eroded. 
Collective action problems lie at their heart of all of those cases.  Much 
though each wishes she could be the sole exception, each would be better off 
if everyone's physician respected the general rule of treating everyone 
(herself included) as she ideally wishes her physician to treat everyone except 
her.  The trick lies in how to secure that outcome, in the absence of some 
external enforcement.   
The problem is that, if left to her own devices, each physician is 
naturally tempted – some would say (wrongly, I shall go on to argue) 
"professionally obliged" (Levinsky, 1984) – to promote the best interests of her 
own patient.  Doing that in the context of a collective action problem would, 
however, mean deviating, in each and every case, from the general rule that 
would be best for all. 
  
 
I.  Particular Interests vs the Common Good 
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Collective action problems arise from the constellation of preferences of each 
of the actors involved  and from the way in which those interact.  Specifically, 
collective action problems arise from agents choosing to act on the basis of 
some "particular interest" rather than on the basis of the "common good" of all 
(Runciman and Sen, 1965).    
 In the case of the fisherfolk, that "particular interest" took the form of a 
self-regarding private motive:  increasing their own catch and hence their 
own profits.  In the case of the physicians as discussed above, that "particular 
interest" is presumed to take the form of an other-regarding motive:  
benefiting one of their own patients.2  What is crucial in generating a 
collective action problem is not whether the agent acts from self- or other-
regarding motives.  What is crucial is, instead, that the agent acts with a view 
to doing what is best not for all those who are affected by the action, but 
rather for some subset of them.   
 That fact suggests one simple solution to collective action problems.  If 
all agents act purely with a view to doing what is best for all agents, no 
collective action problem arises.  With anything short of "all" and "purely" 
collective action problems can still arise, however.   
 For example, a collective action problem would persist, to some greater 
or lesser extent, even if physicians partially internalized the "common good" 
alongside the "particular interests" of their own patients.  The more heavily 
they weigh the former as compared to the latter in their decision-making, the 
2 In a fee-for-service system there might also be self-regarding motives for physicians.  But I 
set that possibility aside for purposes of my discussion here. 
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more often the former will trump the latter for them in deciding what to do, 
and the less severe the collective action problem will be in consequence.  But 
collective action problems would be precluded altogether only if physicians 
give absolute priority to the "common good" over the "particular interests" of 
their own patients, in cases of conflict. 
 Ignoring altogether the "particular interests" of one's own patients – 
even if only where those actually conflict with the "common good" of all 
patients taken together – simply does not come naturally to medical 
practitioners. It clashes with the conceptualization of the first duty of 
physicians as being to their patients (Levinsky, 1984; Snyder, 2012, p. 86 and 
passim).   
  
 
II.  The Permissibility of Particularism 
 
We might query whether that is the correct way to conceptualize the duty of 
the physician.  Maybe physicians have no duty to (or maybe even a moral 
duty not to) help patients pursue every one of the "particular interests" that 
they might happen to have.  That might include even some health-related 
interests. 
 I shall analyze that issue in two steps.  First I shall address the question 
of whether it is morally permissible for any given patient to seek special 
treatment for her own health care needs, over and above that devoted to 
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everyone's similar health care needs. I shall then address the question of 
whether, even if it is morally permissible for any given patient to seek such 
special treatment, it is morally obligatory for physicians to give any patient 
such special treatment.  
  
 
 A.  From the Patient's Perspective 
 
Remember, patients are moral agents too.  They are not merely bearers of 
interests, desires, and impulses; they are also the bearers of moral duties.   
The charge to a physician to attend assiduously to the particular interests of 
her patients is a moral charge.  And one can be morally charged to assist 
others only in pursuing interests that it is morally permissible for those other 
agents to pursue.   
 Thus, in asking what a physician ought to do in furtherance of her 
patients' interests, we have to ask what sorts of interest the patient might 
himself take in his own health.  What will be of most concern to us in relation 
to collective action problems is the sort of interest a patient might take in his 
"relative health status," that is, in his own health status and resources devoted 
to his own health care in comparison to that of others.  What sorts of such 
interests are morally permissible for the patient to take?    
 9 
 Here are three sorts of attitudes one might take to the health of others, 
compared to one's own:  (1) indifference; (2) comparative advantage; (3) no 
comparative disadvantage.  
 Take first the case of someone who is indifferent to the health of others.  
He wants purely to maximize his own health, and he does not care one iota 
about anyone else's health.  If all patients are of this sort, and each physician 
internalizes the interests of their own patients thus understood, that gives rise 
to a collective action problem of the sort discussed above.  Such patients (and 
physicians acting pursuant to their interests thus specified) want to maximize 
their own absolute well-being, without regard to the impact of doing so on 
others.  If others exercise restraint, such a patient (and a physician acting on 
his behalf) would have no hesitation in taking advantage of that fact to 
further his own interests.3 
 Consider next the case of someone who is not indifferent to the health 
status of others but rather seeks comparative advantage over others in that 
respect.4  He might seek to be healthier than others as an end itself.  Or he 
might seek it as a means to some other ends.  Being more malnourished than 
your competitors for the same job puts you at a comparative disadvantage in 
the labor market (Dasgupta and Ray, 1986/7).  So too does being less healthy 
than your competitors.  Insofar as health is a means to other ends that one 
harbors, one might seek comparative advantage over others in the realm of 
health in order to gain more of those other end-use goods (Sen, 1983).  
3 In the terms of game theory, these represent Prisoner's Dilemma style preferences (Luce and 
Raiffa, 1957, pp. 95-102). 
4 In terms of game theory, these represent Status Good preferences (Shubik 1971). 
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 Finally, consider the case of someone who is concerned merely not to 
be put at a comparative disadvantage from exercising restraint that others do 
not reciprocate.5  Someone thus motivated simply does not want to be 
"played for a sucker."   Experimental economists have shown that the impulse 
toward "strong reciprocity" is ubiquitous, not only among people in Europe 
and North America, but also across a wide range of cultures (Bowles and 
Gintis, 2002).   
 Among those preference structures, which count as morally 
permissible?  It would seem clearly impermissible to seek comparative 
advantage over others in the realm of health – certainly insofar as that is 
achieved by actually worsening the health status of others.  Giving others 
some wasting disease or preventing them from being cured of one, just so one 
can get a job ahead of them, is morally unacceptable.  Whatever interest a 
patient might have in doing that, it is not an interest that her physician can be 
morally obliged to help her pursue. 
 Displaying utter indifference to the health of others might be almost as 
bad.  Giving complete weight to one's own health interests, and absolutely 
none to those of others, is morally obnoxious as a failing of human sympathy, 
most would probably agree.  But giving somewhat more weight to one's own 
health than that of others might strike us as morally permissible.  And 
remember, the collective action problem in view arises, to some greater or 
5 In terms of game theory, these represent Assurance Game preferences (Sen 1967). 
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lesser extent, whenever patients (and physicians acting on behalf of them) 
give any extra weight whatsoever to their own particular interests. 
 Consider finally the third stance:  merely not wanting to be played for 
a sucker.  That may not be the most attractive stance that is morally 
conceivable.  Morally, surely it is good to do good for others, whether or not 
they do good for you.  But while that is certainly morally good, not all actions 
that are morally good are morally obligatory for you always to perform.  
Some are supererogatory, above and beyond the strict call of duty, the stuff of 
saints and heroes.  In other cases, the duty to perform a good action takes the 
form of an imperfect duty, one (like the duty of charity) that you should 
perform on some occasions but you need not perform on all occasions.   
 It is unclear precisely what description best fits the duty people (or 
physicians acting on their behalf) have to refrain from using health resources 
that would yield more health benefits if devoted to others.  But as I have 
already said, there seems to be no strict duty to do so.  It seems morally 
permissible for people to weigh their own interests more heavily than those 
of other people, at least to some extent, at least sometimes or in certain sorts 
of circumstances.  And if it is permissible for them to do so unconditionally, it 
is unclear why it should not be permissible for them to do so conditionally – 
specifically, conditional on reciprocity, if and only if others do likewise. 
  
 
 B.  From the Physician's Perspective 
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The upshot of the previous discussion is that it is morally permissible – at 
least sometimes, to some extent – for a patient to display a preference for his 
health needs to be met instead of those of other people with similar health 
needs.  But it does not automatically follow from that fact, necessarily, that it 
would be morally obligatory (or maybe even morally permissible) for that 
patient's physician to act on those preferences.6 
 I have spoken above in terms of the physician being the agent of her 
patients, acting on their behalf.  From the principal's point of view, the whole 
point of hiring an agent is to get someone to do what you want them to do for 
you.  It is in the nature of the relationship, however, that the agent always 
acts with some latitude in pursuit of the principal's objectives, and she may 
well end up doing other than exactly as the principal would wish.  It is not 
simply that that might happen:  it may, in the sense that it is proper that it 
should.  A large part of the point of hiring an agent is that the agent should 
have discretion to exercise her independent judgment in ways to pursue the 
principal's objectives better than the principal would have done on his own. 
 Furthermore, there are some things that you morally may not instruct 
an agent to do for you.  Obviously, this includes things that you are morally 
prohibited from doing altogether:  morally, it is wrong to hire an agent to 
commit a murder for you for the same reason, morally, it is wrong to commit 
the murder yourself.  But there may also be things that would be morally 
6 There are various other situations, too, in which a physician might not be obliged to act on a 
patient's preferences, as when a patient requests an operation whose risks are 
excessive or amputation of a healthy limb in cases of body integrity disorder. 
                                                 
 13 
permissible for you to do yourself that it would not be permissible to instruct 
an agent to do for you.  Morally, it may be permissible for you not to jump in 
and save every drowning child you see at a crowded beach yourself.  But it 
would be morally impermissible for you, when hiring a lifeguard for that 
beach, to instruct her to do the same.7   
 The last two thoughts, taken together, suggest some considerable 
scope for conceptualizing the duties of the physician-cum-agent as being 
somewhat detached from preferences and particular interests of her patient.  
The patient may have an understandable preference for his interests to be 
served ahead of others'.  But that does not automatically translate into a duty 
on his physician slavishly to do so, particularly not if the patient's own larger 
interests would be better served by the physician's doing otherwise in certain 
respects. 
 The latter is likely to be the case, in turn, because of the nature of the 
collective action problem in view.  Everyone would be better off, if everyone 
(or, rather, everyone's physician acting on his behalf) exercised restraint.  
Everyone is symmetrically situated; no one can have any reasonable, realistic 
expectations of being treated differently than anyone else.  If it must be the 
case either that all exercise restraint or that none do, each patient is clearly 
better off in the former case than the latter.8   
7 Permissions in general are not transferable.  When I give you permission to enter my house, 
that does not give you any right to give permission to others to enter. 
8 If it is the case that some need not exercise restraint so long as others do, the strategic 
structure of the game changes:  it is then not a pure collective action (Prisoner's 
Dilemma) game, but rather an instance of a Chicken game nesting within a 
Prisoner's Dilemma (Taylor and Ward, 1982). 
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III.  Professional Norms Encompass All Particular Interests   
 
As I said at the outset, collective action problems arise from people pursuing 
particular interests rather than the common good of all.  One very standard 
solution to the problem is to create a collective group agent responsible for 
serving the interests of all and to charge that collective group agent with the 
task of making decisions for the group as a whole.  Representing as it does 
the group as a whole, that collective group agent has no particular interests 
apart from the common good of all.  The collective action problem is thus 
straightforwardly resolved. 
 That is the way Nordic countries traditionally avoided the 
counterproductive consequences of dispersed wage bargaining.  Inflation 
arises from (among other things) wage competition.  Trade unions strive to 
obtain competitive advantage for their own members in seeking higher wage 
rates than workers in other sectors of the economy.  But if all independently 
pursued their particular interests in that respect, all workers would be worse 
off; the ensuing inflation would more than erode the purchasing power of all 
nominal wage gains.  In Scandinavia, the solution historically took the form 
of a single umbrella organization (such as Sweden's LO, the 
Landsorganisationen) being charged with the task of negotiating wages for 
workers across the country as a whole.  Encompassing the interests of all 
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workers as a whole, the LO avoided the problem of counterproductive 
pursuit of sectoral advantage (Olson, 1982, pp. 89-92; cf. Hernes, 1991).   The 
common good of all was secured in this way by entrusting its pursuit to some 
organization whose sole interest was in the good of all. 
 Professions can be like that.  Even if particular physicians feel duty 
bound to internalize the interests of their own particular patients, the 
profession (and associations representing the profession as a whole) can 
internalize the interests of all the patients of all the physicians.   
 Where what is good for each will be undermined by independently 
pursuing what is good for each, a better outcome for each can be achieved by 
collectively pursuing the good of all.  That is the general thought.   
 As applied to the case of health care rationing, the thought is that 
every patient will be better off than he would otherwise have been if 
profession-wide norms of good practice in the effective use of medical 
resources are imposed. Such a system will be an improvement over the 
practice of entrusting rationing decisions to the discretion of particular 
physicians at the bedside of particular patients one-by-one.  In bowing to 
those norms, the physician is doing precisely what a good agent ought to do – 
pursuing her principal's (i.e., patient's) interests in ways different from but 
better than they would be if the principal- cum-patient's own particular 
preference in the matter were slavishly respected. 
 Far from breaching their professional duties of care toward their 
patients, then, physicians would actually be best discharging them by 
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developing profession-wide standards of health-care rationing that all those 
physicians then all implement.  Bedside rationing systematically governed by 
such professional norms would be not only for the good of all.  It would also 
be for the good of each, seen from a broader perspective.  Each trying to get 
more than that would lead, ultimately, to each getting less than that.9 
 
 
IV.  The Physician's "First Duty" – Not "Only Duty" 
 
To say that "the physician's first and primary duty is to the patient" (Snyder 
2012, p. 86) is not to say that that is the physician's only duty.  Nor is it to say 
that that "first and primary duty" cannot itself be overridden by other 
weighty considerations, from time to time.   
 Wendler (2010) offers various examples of exceptions to the rule 
always to do what is in a patient's best interest.  That occurs, for example, 
when an attending physician allows her intern to insert the central line rather 
than doing it herself, even though that poses somewhat more risk to the 
patient, on the grounds that learning-by-doing is the only way for new 
physicians to be properly trained.    
More generally, the rule always to do what is in your patient's best 
interest is violated whenever you have multiple patients whose needs make 
competing demands on your time, attention, and resources.  This happens 
9 That is, over a substantial run of relevantly similar cases.  Of course, the Keynesian 
aphorism, "In the long run, we're all dead," can apply with special force in some 
medical cases.  
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most clearly in emergency medicine, whenever one patient's treatment is 
postponed to allow treatment of another patient with more urgent needs.  In 
order to do what is in the latter patient's best interest, the emergency 
physician has to do something that is not in the former patient's best interest 
(postpone treatment).    
Indeed, the rule always to do what is in your patient's best interest, 
when you have multiple patients with competing claims, involves a notorious 
logical fallacy familiar from Bentham's initial sloppy statement of the 
fundamental rule of utilitarianism as "the greatest good to the greatest 
number" of people.  The rule, as stated, demands the maximization of two 
functions at once – such a double maximand is a nonsense.  What does good 
for "the greatest number of people" might be one thing, what does the 
"greatest good" aggregating the good done to all people might be something 
else altogether.  The rule always to do what is in your patient's best interest, 
when you have multiple patients whose interests are not necessarily perfectly 
aligned, involves an identical nonsense.  It involves a maximization exercise 
that is logically impossible to perform. 
The duty always to do what is in your patient's best interest is thus the 
physician's first but not only duty.  Among other things, the physician has 
identical duties to her other patients.  She has one duty qua "this patient's 
physician"; she has another duty qua "that patient's physician"; and insofar as 
their medical needs make conflicting claims on her, discharging those twin 
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duties as best she is able will typically preclude the physician from doing 
literally what is in the very best interests of either of the two patients. 
Let us now generalize one step further, from:  (1) "the duty of the 
physician, qua 'this patient's physician,' to this particular patient"; to (2) "the 
duty of the physician, qua 'these patients' physician,' to all of her patients"; to 
(3) "the duty of the physician, qua physician (to all patients)."  The sorts of 
tradeoffs involved in (2) (between the competing claims of all of the 
physician's own patients) provide a model for the sorts of tradeoffs that are 
involved in (3) (between the competing claims of all patients of physicians in 
general) (Tavaglione and Hurst, 2012: 11).  Those latter tradeoffs lie at the 
heart of the duty of "stewardship of resources" enunciated in the Ethics 
Manual of the American College of Physicians.10 
What is undeniably true is that the sorts of tradeoffs involved in both (2) 
and (3) are best governed according to rules set down somewhere other than 
at the bedside (Snyder 2012, p. 90). At the bedside, the physician's "primary 
role" is indeed "as a [particular] patient's trusted advocate."  But in 
determining what she may or may not legitimately do to best further the 
interests of that particular patient, the bedside physician must reflect on a 
wider set of laws, rules, and professional norms crafted with a view on how 
best to further the interests of all patients.  The rule that the physician should 
not lie to insurance companies to maximize her patient's payout is one such 
10 "Physicians have a responsibility to practice effective and efficient health care and to use 
health care resources responsibly.  Parsimonious care that utilizes the most efficient 
means to effectively diagnose a condition and treat a patient respects the need to 
use resources wisely and to help ensure that resources are equitably available" 
(Snyder 2012, p. 87, see similarly p. 90). 
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rule, from a very different realm (Snyder, 2012, p. 89).11  Another is the rule 
that the physician should "use all health-related resources in a technically 
appropriate and efficient manner" and "plan work-ups carefully and avoid 
unnecessary testing, medications, surgery and consultations" (Snyder, 2012, 
p. 90).  Rules like that are best made by reflecting upon the duties of the 
physician to all of her patients (in 2) or upon the duties of physicians as a 
whole to all of their patients (in 3), and then imposed as constraints on the 
decision-making of any particular physician at any particular patient's 
bedside. 
Seen as a solution to a collective action problem, such profession-wide 
setting of rules and norms to govern bedside practice will have the effect of 
doing the best that realistically can be done for patients themselves.  If every 
patient's physician tried to do better for her own patient than that, the upshot 
would be that everyone's patients (including, over the long term, that patient 
herself) would be worse off.  Physicians binding themselves to a system of 
restraint in that way is what truly serves the best interests of their patients, 
individually as well as collectively, over the long haul. 
 
 
V.  Other Solutions 
 
11 At least not unless the physician is operating in an "unjust restrictive environment" 
(Tavaglione and Hurst 2012). 
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I have recommended a system of professional norms that could 
systematically guide bedside rationing, as my preferred mechanism for 
managing those tradeoffs collectively.  That is not the only conceivable way to 
solve the collective action problem surrounding health care resources, of 
course.  Considering the limits of the alternatives, however, I think it the best. 
 One class of alternatives would involve the direct regulation of 
medical practice by state authorities.  One solution, for example, would be 
simply to enact legislation that restricts undesirable practices and/or imposes 
preferred medical practices.  We might be able to do that in rare cases.  We 
might legislate to compel all school children to be vaccinated against certain 
specified diseases, for example.  Or in centralized healthcare systems such as 
the British National Health Service, authorities can simply "remove some 
services completely... off the list of services that they make available to 
patients in their regions" (Rogers and Braunack-Mayer, 2004, p. 84). But as a 
general strategy, that is politically unrealistic in most places.  It is probably 
medically ill advised as well.  Politicians writing general rules cannot hope to 
capture the nuance of particular cases; the exercise of some physician 
discretion, operating under looser forms of professional norms, would lead to 
better health outcomes (Goodin, 1982, ch. 5; Braithwaite et al., 2007).   
 A weaker version of that might be to require physicians to get specific 
permission from some central authority for prescribing particularly expensive 
treatment, requiring the physician to justify that treatment in the particular 
case.  The Australian Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme operates that way with 
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respect to a restricted list of particularly expensive medicines.  Or maybe it 
might suffice just to impose a requirement for physicians to file a report to 
some central authority when opting for hyper-expensive treatments.  Simply 
"knowing they're being watched" might encourage physicians to self-censor 
their overuse of expensive products and procedures.  Such solutions might go 
some way toward ameliorating collective action problems, but they cannot be 
expected to eliminate them altogether. 
 A second class of alternatives works on the supply side to avoid 
overuse of especially expensive medical products or procedures.  For capital-
intensive branches of medicine, for example, you can simply not buy the 
machine.  In that way you can guarantee that no one overuses a machine that 
is not available (Aaron and Schwartz, 1984, p. 128).  But of course that 
guarantee comes at the cost of no one being able to use a machine that is 
unavailable, even if such a machine has been developed and marketed. 
 A third class of alternatives works on the demand side.  Among a 
small and stable group of actors, collective action problems can often be 
reliably overcome through systems of reciprocal forbearance, enforced by 
breaches being punished by tit-for-tat retaliation in subsequent rounds of the 
game (Axelrod, 1984; Ostrom, 1990).  Sometimes that might work in a health-
care context.  In a small community with only a handful of physicians, access 
to local hospital might be successfully controlled in that way.  But as a general 
strategy for a very large municipal (much less national) community of 
patients and physicians, that solution is simply not viable. 
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 A fourth class of alternatives involves partial implementation of the 
scheme described above for solving collective action problems through the 
use of all-encompassing organizations.  If you want an organization that is 
literally all encompassing – that is responsible for looking after the interests of 
literally all patients – then you will need to be thinking in terms of something 
like the profession as a whole.12  But partial versions of that strategy are 
available, and have sometimes been implemented with limited success.   
 An example of that is the GP Fundholder scheme introduced into the 
British National Health Service under the Tories in 1991 and its successor (the 
Primary Care Trusts) under the subsequent Labour Government.  That 
scheme had the effect of making each medical practice internalize the 
interests of its portfolio of patients as a whole.  Resources devoted to one of a 
practice's patients were resources that would not then be available to other 
patients of that same practice, toward whom physicians associated with that 
practice had just the same professional obligations.   
 Such schemes encourage physicians to think in terms of the common 
good of patients in their practice.  But they still leave physicians pursuing the 
particular interests of the patients in their own practice, at the expense of 
patients in other practices.  That is a flaw that is endemic to any partially 
encompassing solution to a collective action problem.13  
12 Or the state.  The reason the state can resolve collective action problems is that it has 
coercive powers with which to enforce its edicts.  The reason it does, when it does, 
is that it internalizes the interests of all those under its jurisdiction. 
13 That is not the only flaw with such schemes, of course.  Worse is the risk that practices will 
"cherry-pick" good patients who are cheap and easy to care for, while patients with 
costly or complex conditions prove unable to find care. 
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VI.  Conclusion 
 
Physicians confront collective action problems all the time.  Each vigorously 
pursuing the interests of each of their patients often leads to outcomes that 
are worse for all patients.  Each physician's patients would typically be better 
off if all physicians exercised restraint in the use of healthcare resources.  That 
might be accomplished, after a fashion, in any of many ways.  But the best is 
almost certainly one that leaves room for the exercise of clinical judgment, 
whilst subjecting that to some collective discipline.  The medical profession as 
a whole ought to develop norms to govern the appropriate use of scarce 
healthcare resources.  Physicians engaged in bedside rationing can be guided 
by such norms, confident in the knowledge that in abiding by them they are 
indeed doing their best by their patients overall.14   
 
14 Some may be tempted to respond "there is no such thing as 'the medical profession as a 
whole, merely all sorts of competing sub-specialties trying to maximize resources 
available to them.'"  In response to them, I would simply repeat the last two 
sentences of the text.  Competition among sub-specialties for scarce resources is 
simply another collective action problem, in which all would benefit if all exercised 
restraint; and that is best accomplished via coordination orchestrated by the most 
all-encompassing group ("the medical profession as a whole").  Where that group is 
not yet collectively organized the first task, of morality and extended prudence 
alike, is to see to it that it gets effectively organized. 
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